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PRELUDE TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN 
CAPITALIST COUNTRIES IN THE 1930’S
b y
IM R E  LÁNG
By the  fall of 1933 tlie hectic days of the  Rooseveltian “H undred 
D ays” were over already. This prom pted the A dm inistration to  strike 
some sort of a balance. Only a  few m onths elapsed since the  Roosevelt 
Governm ent had taken office, yet th is short period was full of events 
which took place in quick succession. The m arch of tim e gathered  momen­
tum  since March, 1933. D uring the “H undred  D ays” the  A dm inistration 
took energetic measures, aim ed at expediting the recovery process of the  
depression-hit American economy, and Congress responded to  the  in itia ­
tives of the Government w ith feverish haste, a t tim es even overstepping 
th e  in tentions of the  Executive Branch.
The first m easure was the consolidation of the  Am erican banking 
system , shaken by mass hysteria  th a t had spread as a chain-reaction 
throughout the  country in early 1933. Though the  Banking Act of M arch 
9 had been adopted by Congress as an emergency m easure, it soon tra n s­
p ired  th a t its provisions opened a new chapter in Am erican economic 
policy. The im m ediate aim  was to  elim inate the  banking crisis. The 
Executive was granted  unprecedented powers in respect of the  regulation 
o f the  American currency system , including the m anagem ent of gold and 
foreign exchange transactions. Bv v irtue of the  Banking Act the  Govern­
m ent suspended th e  operation of the  gold s tandard , by prohibiting, for 
th e  duration  of the  national emergency, the exporta tion  of gold. A P resi­
dential proclam ation of April 19 declared th a t the  emergency continued 
to  exist. Consequently, the  previous measures were confirmed, the  ban 
on the  export of gold was upheld, and the Secretary of Treasury was em ­
powered to  issue licences for gold exports in stric tly  defined exceptional 
cases only. Thus, the  U nited  States, main creditor of the  cap italist world 
and stronghold of m onetary orthodoxy, definitely abandoned th e  gold 
s tandard . The dollar began to  depreciate. The A dm inistration was con­
vinced th a t , by abandoning the gold s tandard  and allowing the  dollar 
to  depreciate, the  realization of one of the  m ain objectives of the  New 
Deal, viz th e  rise of the  in ternal price level, was fac ilita ted .1
A few weeks la te r, on May 12, the  A gricultural A djustm ent Act 
(AAA), aim ed a t the  rehabilitation  of American agriculture, went into
effect. As one of the  arch itects of the  Act pu t it, the  AAA was “the g rea t­
est single experim ent in economic planning under capitalist conditions 
ever a ttem pted  by a democracy in tim es of peace” .2 The main objectives 
of t he Act were to  raise and stabilize farm er incomes, to  m itigate the  bu r­
den of farm er debts, to  cut down agricultural surpluses and prevent their 
accum ulation. The Act conferred wide powers upon the  Executive, and 
made provisions for various m ethods th a t  enabled the A dm inistration to  
a tta ck  the  main objectives of agricultural rehabilitation. The m ethods 
covered, on the  one hand, revived devices inherited from the  past, and 
new ones yet to  be tried , on the  other. L im itation of ou tpu t, and compen­
sating the  farm ers for such lim itations, were th e  hard  core of the  m eth ­
ods. As a result of the  fierce struggle of th e  defenders of farm er 
in terests the  so-called Thom as Am endm ent became part of the Act, and  
provided for the  m onetary weapon. By v irtue  of the  Am endm ent the  
President was empowered to  reduce th e  gold content of the  dollar by 
50 per cent, or any less proportion, to  use silver for m onetary purposes, 
and  to  issue “greenbacks” .
Simultaneously w ith the  debates in Congress concerning agricultural 
ad justm en t, two alternative d rafts, relating to  industrial recovery and 
alleviating unemployment by means of public works, were completed. By 
am algam ating the  two d rafts  a bill was prepared and subm itted  to  Con­
gress. On Ju n e  10, the  N ational Industria l Recovery Act went into effect. 
As Roosevelt put it, th e  Act was an historical experiment in govern­
m ent partnersh ip  w ith business, the  purpose of which was to  p u t people 
back to  work, to  raise purchasing power of labour by lim iting hours and 
increasing wages, to  establish decent working conditions, and to  enable 
industry  to  act in unison which had been unlawful previously.3 In  fact, 
R oosevelt’s words pointed to  the  contradictions of the  law, the  weight 
of which caused its  collapse afte r two years. The President was righ t 
in saying th a t  the  Act was an experim ent , for its architects a ttem p ted  to  
reconcile conflicting interests. I ts  main features were th e  following. Essen­
tially , big business was given t he right to  organize industria l production, for 
the  industries became entitled  to  fix  the  prices of their products and to  
establish the term s and conditions of production and distribu tion  within 
the  so-called codes. The industries for which codes were established were 
exem pted from  th e  a n titru s t laws th a t  had been enacted some decades 
ago w ith a view to  curbing the  excesses of com binations and to  ensuring 
freedom of com petition. U nder the  Act the man in the  street was to  be 
protected  by Governm ental supervision of the  monopolies, while labour 
was given the  right to  join any trad e  union and to  collective bargaining.
The measures aim ed at the  rehabilitation  of industrial production 
and the  consolidation of the  economy could not yield im m ediate results. 
On the  o ther hand, the  distress of th e  depression-stricken masses had to  
be alleviated w ithout delay. W ays and  means had to  be found for provid­
ing relief to  the  millions of unemployed, bu t the  chief task  was to  find  
job for them . Relief to  unemployed was considered by the  Hoover A d­
m inistration as a local affair, while the  task  of the  Federal Governm ent
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was confined to  extending some loans to  the  s ta te s  and m unicipalities, 
in support of th e ir relief activities. This narrow  in te rp re ta tion  of the 
A dm in istra tion’s ta sk  proved to  lie hopelessly inadequate  under the  
circum stances of the depression, while the  am ounts of the  loans, extended 
to  local authorities, lagged far behind the  needs. U nder the  pressure of 
mass distress, relief ac tiv ity  became inevitably  a task  of the  Federal Gov­
ernm ent. In  March and April, Congress passed, w ith an overwhelming 
m ajority  of votes, tlie Federal Emergency Relief Act which went in to  
effect on May 12. It m ade 500 million dollars available to  the  new Federal 
Em ergency Relief A dm inistrat ion. This agency provided to  local au th o r­
ities grants-in-aid  for relief purposes. However, the  distress of the  masses, 
capable of working, could be eased by relief m easures tem porarily  
only. They had to  be p u t to  work. I t  was the Public W orks A dm inistra­
tion, a new Federal agency set up under the  N ational Industria l Recov­
ery Act, which was en trusted  w ith th is task . The agency was to  adm inis­
te r  the public works program  for which 3,3 billion dollars were made 
available under the Act. The Public W orks A dm inistration was en titled  
to  in itia te  its  own projects, to  provide financial assistance to  o ther feder­
al agencies engaged in public works projects, and  to  ex tend  loans and 
gran ts for sim ilar purposes to  local authorities and p rivate  firm s.
There was still another im portan t field where energetic and urgent 
m easures were required. This was the  banking system  and the securities 
m arket. Public opinion held the  labyrin th  of the  Am erican banking sys­
tem , and speculation in securities, responsible for the  1929 crash. I t  was 
generally believed th a t  the  banks and the  stock exchange had provided, 
during the  years of prosperity, unlim ited opportunities for dishonest 
dealings w ith  the  money of th e  man in the  stree t. The Truth-in-,Securities 
Act which became law on May 27 ordered full disclosure of d a ta  in con­
nection w ith the  issue of new securities and imposed heavy penalties for 
m isrepresenting relevant facts. The Banking Act of Ju n e  16 divorced com­
mercial banking from investm ent: banks accepting deposits were forbidden 
to  combine the said  ac tiv ity  w ith the  business in securities.
$
When strik ing th e  firs t half-year balance of the  New Deal the  A dm in­
istra tion  had to  adm it the fact th a t the upswing of the  economy which 
had lasted until Ju ly  came to  a standstill in the  ensuing m onths. Moreover, 
the  basic indicators showed a tendency of setback. As from  February  to  
Ju ly , 1933, agricultural prices had increased by about 50 per cent., but 
by October they  fell by 7,5 per cent, from  the  Ju ly  level. On the  o ther hand, 
industrial production which had increased between April and Ju ly , 1933, 
by 66 per cent., fell by 23 per cent, until October.4 There were alarm ing 
news about farm ers’ unrest. The farm ers w anted the  A dm inistration to  
introduce more effective price raising policies, while Congressional ad ­
vocates of farm er in terests dem anded consistent in fla tionary  measures. 
At th e  same tim e, industrial and banking circles objected to  governm en­
tal in tervention, and  were increasingly pressing for a re tu rn  to  trad itional
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economic policies. The Administration was at the cross-roads. Two courses 
seemed open to it. One was to acquiesce in the demands of farmers in 
respect of inflation, “greenbacks”, and the use of silver for monetary 
purposes. The other was to hold out the prospect of the stabilization of 
the dollar and the return to gold in a not too distant future, so as to pla­
cate t he financial circles whose fetish was gold.
The A dm inistration rejected both alternatives. It decided to  give an 
im petus to  the  process of recovery by means of m onetary m anagement, 
and to  control the  inflationary  curve. Thus, the  extrem e views of the  
inflationists who were reviving Populist trad itions of the  past century, 
as well as those of “economic royalists” , the  most intransigent represent­
atives of the finance-capital, were repudiated . The A dm inistration, ma- 
noeuvering between the  extrem e views, was looking for new devices of 
s ta te  in tervention. Meanwhile, the A dm inistration had to  admit tha t in 
order to  be able to  a ttack  successfully the  endangered basic objective of 
the New Deal, viz. the  raising of the internal price level, a more direct 
and efficient means was to  be found th an  th a t which had been employed 
in the  spring. Roosevelt, who willingly subscribed to  the  theoretical con­
siderations on which th e  monetary’ policy of the  New Deal was based, 
regarded th e  “managed dollar” concept as a  lever facilitating the  re­
covery of the  American econom y. However, he was not aware as to  how 
th is lever was to  be applied in the  new situation. It was again Professor 
W arren who, like in early 1933, pu t forw ard his proposals. He suggested 
th a t the Government should purchase gold at prices to-be raised gradually 
but at a  rapid pace. The aim to be achieved was s ta te d  by him to  be a 
41 per cent, depreciation of the  dollar. He warned th a t  the p ro tracted  
debates concerning the legality of the  gold purchases were bound to  cause 
loss of t ¡me.5
Several motives prompted Roosevelt, who was in favour of novel 
and untried ideas, to approve the proposals of Warren. First of all. the 
proposals were in harmony with his “managed dollar” concept. Further, 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act empowered the Executive to lower the 
gold content of the dollar, and the extent of the depreciation, as proposed 
by Warren, was within the limits set by’ the AAA. The concept of the 
“managed dollar” seemed to be a middle course which, in case of its 
realization, was likely to contribute to the control of runaway-inflation 
tendencies. On the other hand, the concept promised protection from the 
recurrence of deflation. Finally, the new role of the gold was likely to 
arrest the attention of the finance-capital.
The legal debates were concluded to  the  satisfaction of the Adminis­
tra tion . Contrary to  his previous stand , the  A ttorney-General ruled that 
th e  President was authorized to  purchase gold. Thus, there was a green 
light for t he new experim ent . In his broadcast address of October 22, 1933, 
Roosevelt announced the gold purchasing program , and held out to  the  
nation th e  prospect of a dollar “which will not change its purchasing 
power during the  succeeding generation”/ ’
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O riginally, the  Am erican Governm ent in tended to  confine its  purchases 
to  newly m ined domestic gold, at prices som ew hat higher th an  those 
ruling on the  world m arket. I t  was soon realized, however, th a t  in order 
to  be able to  control effectively the  price of gold, buying policy should 
be extended abroad. Roosevelt and his advisers were convinced th a t  the  
gold bloc, led by France, and  the  sterling bloc were m aking efforts to  
m oderate th e  depreciation of th e  dollar. The President was particularly  
irr ita ted  by the  m anoeuvres of th e  Bank of England and the  Exchange 
E qualization Fund. (The la tte r  was given the  task  of checking th e  fluc tu ­
ations of th e  foreign exchange valim of the  sterling.) W ith a v ie w to  neu­
tralizing th e  alleged anti-dollar manoeuvres th e  Government announced, 
on October 20, its in tention to  buy foreign gold as well. The Recon­
struction  Finance Corporation, which had been authorized to  adm inister 
the  program , raised gradually the  buying price of gold, and carried out 
occasional purchases abroad. The exchange ra te  of the  dollar fell steadily, 
though th e  process came at tim es to  a tem porary halt.
In early Jan u ary , 1934, th e  experiences connected with the  gold 
purchases offered certain  lessons. One was th a t the  W arren theory  did 
not come up to  expectations, in th a t the com m odity prices did not rise 
in proportion to  the depreciation of the  dollar (viz. the increase of the 
price of gold). D espite the support extended to  th e  farm ers the  agricul­
tu ral situation  did not improve, and the  ad justm ent of the struc tu re  of 
agricult ural and industrial prices did not take place. Differences of opinion 
between the  supporters and opponents of the m onetary  policy o f the  New 
Deal sharpened. The clash between relevant views w ithin the  Govern­
ment led to  the resignation of Dean Acheson, U nder Secretary of the  T reas­
ury . who was an ardent supporter of conservative m onetary policies. 
This step foreshadowed t he growing opposition of the  finance-capital, a 
fact that had to  be reckoned w ith by the A dm inistration. Finally, the 
news coming from  abroad, relating to  the gold purchases, the  alm ost 
hysterical atm osphere of the  foreign m arkets and the growing alarm  
of W estern European countries, w arned W ashington to  give heed to  
in ternational repercussions.
The A dm inistration came to  the  conclusion th a t  the  gold purchasing 
program  was to  be stopped. I t was obvious th a t  in order to  be able to  
realize the  increase of the  value of American gold stocks, a  fact due to  
the rise of the  gold price, the  la tte r  should bestabilized, and Congression­
al approval should be obtained. Growing scepticism in respect of the 
W arren theory was a fu rther factor which called for the term ination  of 
the  gold purchasing program . Doubts, regarding th e  influence of American 
gold purchases on the world m arket gold price, were another factor. 
Towards th e  end of 1933. Jacob Viner, Professor of the Chicago U niversity, 
investigated the  European foreign exchange situation , and came to  the  
conclusion th a t the relatively small American purchases were inadequate 
for influencing the  external value of the  dollar.7 Finally, there were argu­
m ents to  the  effect th a t  it was not the external depreciation of the  dollar
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but th e  increasing dom estic dem and for goods was the  proper weapon in 
the  b a ttle  for higher in ternal prices.
The A dm inistration decided in favour of stabilization. I bus, the  
m onetary experim ent th a t  had lasted for alm ost a year and to  which 
m any hopes of the New Dealers had been a ttached  in 1933, came to  an 
end. A Presidential message of Ja n u ary  15, 1934, asked Congress to  set an 
upper limit of GO cents gold for the  new value of the  dollar, and to  vest 
t he title  of all m onetary gold of the nation in th e  Treasury. Roosevelt also 
suggested to  the  Congress to  set up a fund of 2,000 million dollars, to  be 
based upon the  profits resulting from  the devaluation of the dollar. The 
purpose of the fund was s ta ted  to  be to  regulate the  value of the dollar.8 
On Ja n u arv  3<>. 1934. the Congress passed the  Gold Reserve Act by over­
whelming m ajority . The following day the  President fixed the new gold 
value of the  dollar at 59.06 cents a t the  old parity . As a  result of the 
40.94 per cent, devaluation of the  dollar the value of the  American gold 
stocks rose by 2,805 million dollars. The revaluation of the  gold stocks 
made the  establishm ent of a  S tabilization Fund possible."
The dollar devaluation gave some relief to  the  capitalist world. 
It was hoped th a t  by stabilizing the  American currency the unforesee­
able, spasmodic m onetary m anipulations of the  Cnited States, th a t 
had  caused repeated anxieties to  the  capitalist countries, came to  an 
end. Conservative financial circles predicted American re tu rn  to  gold. 
Those in favour of international cooperation hoped for a change in the 
American a ttitu d e  tow ard com m itm ents abroad. In the  opinion of such 
circles the  United S tates made a decisive step  in the right direction, 
tow ards assum ing th e  role of the  largest creditor country  and adopting 
a  foreign economic policy, in line w ith the  American economic potential 
and the  long-run in terests of the  capitalist world. 1 lie task  of t his foreign 
economic policy, it was asserted, was to  decrease gradually the  existing 
disequilibrium  of economic relations between capitalist countries.
There were several factors, however, which indicated th a t the  Amer­
ican Government did not intend to  re tu rn  to  the  pre-1933 m onetary 
policy. W ashington continued to  em phasize the prim acy of domestic 
objectives. The capitalist world was particu larly  irrita ted  by the fact 
th a t W ashington did not make a sta tem ent in favour of a fixed exchange 
ra te , one of the  principal requirem ents of the  gold standard . The Presi­
dent, in fact, s ta ted  th a t  the  gold content of the dollar continued to  be 
determ ined by the  in terests of the  United States. In view of the objec­
tives and m ethods of the  New Deal this sta tem ent indicated th a t the 
value of the dollar depended on the  considerations of domestic eco­
nomic policy, and thus th e  possibility of fu rther changes in the  ex­
change ra te  was not ruled out. A fu rther disturbing factor was th a t 
the  extent of the devaluation was, as m easured on the  basis of pur­
chasing power, larger than  necessary. The undervalued dollar was a po­
ten tia l th rea t to  capitalist countries in respect of American com petition 
on the  world m arket. These countries were no longer exposed to  the  
dangers of a “floa ting” exchange ra te  of the dollar. They had to  face the
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permanent competition of an undervalued, stabilized dollar, while 
the undervaluation of the American currency aggravated the difficul­
ties of the rest of the world in selling goods to the United States. Owing 
to the fact that the President did not exhaust the authority, obtained 
by virtue of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, a probable further devalu­
ation was an additional threat. It was an open question, therefore 
whether the President intended to avail himself of the said opportunity, 
and if so. when. The consequence of a persistent American export surplus, 
fed by the undervalued dollar, was the intensification of the gold flow 
to the l  nited States. This was a new challenge to the capitalist world 
which was suffering from a chronic disequilibrium anyway. The gold 
flow to the United States was given an impetus bv the new gold price 
35 dollars per ounce, for it augmented the supply of foreign gold, sold witli 
American destination. In February, the first post-devaluation month, 
the American Treasury bought gold valued at 400 million dollars. In March 
the gold purchases amounted to 237 million dollars.10
E vents following the dollar devaluation lent support to  those who had 
some reservations in respect of the  American changes. W ashington con­
tinued to  insist on the  “managed dollar” concept. However, there  was 
a shift in the  th inking  of the  T reasury. It was held th a t the  stabilized 
dollar was a  b e tte r  means to  serve the ends of the New Deal than  the 
floating exchange ra te  had been in 1933. On th e  other hand, the  capitalist 
world opined th a t th is change in method, in fact, am ounted to  a  repen t­
ance on th e  part of the  U nited  S tates which thus gave up m onetary 
experim entation. In reality , the past m onths tau g h t a le sso n to th e  U nit­
ed States. In 1933 Roosevelt and his closest advisers were convinced 
th a t, by m aking the United S tates independent of 1 he pressure of econom ­
ic events abroad  and by pursuing an autonom ous m onetary policy, 
the price-raising policies, supported  by the  depreciation of tlie dollar, 
were to  m ake headway without obstacles. It was on the  basis of th is con­
sideration th a t the  President rejected the dollar-sterling-franc exchange 
stabilization d raft, as proposed a t the 1933 World Economic Conference i* 
The dollar stabilization reflected the  change in W ashington’s consider­
ations. As from 1934 it was adm itted  by the A dm inistration th a t under 
given circum stances it was no longer possible to  disregard the  in te rna­
tional m onetary situation. Roosevelt held th a t the  counter-m easures of 
foreign countries, especially those of Britain, might d istu rb  the  American 
steps. Hence, it became the order of the day to  come to an agreement 
with those whose cooperation had been vehem ently rejected bv W ash­
ington in the  sum m er of 1933. The President instructed  one of the 
leading banks in New \  ork to  make unofficial enquiries in London con­
cerning t he Bi itish a ttitu d e  t owards a dollar-sterling exchange ra te  stab ili­
zation agreem ent. The response was non-com m ittal. Montague Norm an, 
Governor of the  Bank of England, tu rned  down a perm anent stabilization 
bu t did not preclude the  possibility of an ad hoc cooperation .lt was not d iffi­
cult to  infer from this British a ttitu d e  th a t the  protection of the dollar re­
quired the establishm ent of an American s ta te  agency sim ilar to  the ef-
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ficient Exchange Equalization Account of Great B ritain . It was felt in 
W ashington th a t , failing to  do this, the  London m anoeuvres might 
drive upw ard th e  dollar exchange ra te . This consideration led to  the de­
cision to  set up  an American Stabilization Fund, to  be able to  keep a 
check on the dollar exchange ra te  and neutralize the  British measures. - 
To a superficial observer the  American a ttitu d e  might seem to  have 
changed com pleted , since it was W ashington which made enquiries 
regardin'* an exchange stabilization agreem ent, a m easure that had been 
regarded some tim e back as a betrayal of domestic interests. 1 Ins was not 
th e  case, however. The Gold Reserve Act did not rest ore gold to  its 11n one. 
The U nited S tates did not re tu rn  to  the  gold standard , the  main criteria 
of which, viz. the  internal circulation of gold, the obligation to  cany  
out conversions at a fixed exchange rate , the freedom ol gold exports 
and im ports, were discarded. There was no change in respect of t he essence 
and main objectives of the m onetary policy of t he New Deal, only its 
m ethods were adjusted  to  the  new realities. However, the  enquiries made 
bv W ashington in respect oft he British a ttitu d e  were a sign of a  new Irene 
iii the  evolution process of the  “managed dollar” policy, to  be implem ented
l.v the monopoly capitalist sta te . W ashington was anxious to  find a 
modus vivendi w ith the  strongest com petitor, Britain. 1 hough the lust 
a ttem p t had failed, subsequent events proved th a t it was international 
cooperation which became one of the  main elements of American mono- 
t a rv poliev This new svm ptom  of American m onetary policy already 
went bevond the  domestic objectives, which were nevertheless stressed 
as before and enjoyed priority . It witnessed a willingness, on the part of 
W ashington, 1 (»cooperate in the consol idat ion of t he capitalist world order.
*
The answer of Montague Norm an, viz. the rejection of a perm anent 
exchange rate  stabilization and the  cautious approval of an ad hoc ( (»op­
eration between London and W ashington, corresponded to  the  mam 
objectives and m ethods of British economic polity. In 1 9 3 1 -3 2  Britain 
em barked upon Im perial protectionism . The main objective oi Hus 
economic poliev was to  hamm er out a  bloc, with its centre in London, 
built upon, and cemented by, a system  of m onetary and commercial 
arrangem ents. The bloc was formed a t a tim e when the depression was 
at its°lowest ebb and  economic relations of the  capitalist world were 
disorganized. The chief raison d'etre of the bloc was self-defence, a n a tu ­
ral consequence of the  circum stances which prevailed at the tim e of its 
b irth . I ts  wall had to  be strong enough to  w ithstand the waves of the 
depression and had to  foster sound economic relations within the bloc. 
The arrangem ents made by London turned  Britain, previous strong­
hold of Free Trade, in to  a regulating centre of a bloc of regional protec­
tionism  This was in accordance w ith th e  advance of the development pro­
cess of monopolv capitalism . The main pillars of the  bloc were m onetary 
cooperation, based on pound sterling th a t  had left the gold standard  
in Septem ber 1931, and the  trade  agreem ents concluded in O ttaw a m
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th e  course of 1932. M onetary and commercial arrangem ents jo in tly  in ten ­
sified the  integration process w ithin the  bloc.
The suspension of the  gold standard  in B ritain  was a  shock to  the  
capitalist world. T he countries which were linked w ith London on the 
streng th  of political and economic ties had to  face th ree  alternatives, 
th e  first a lternative was to  keep their currencies on gold. A nother was 
t he possibility of pegging their currencies to  sterling. The th ird  a lte rn a ­
tive was to  decide in favour of an independent m onetary policy. As far 
as the countries of the British Commonwealth were concerned the 
three a lternatives were, in fact, reduced to  one. They had no choice but 
to  peg their currencies to  sterling, with the  result th a t  th e  value of the 
local currencies decreased along w ith th a t of the pound .T here  were only 
tw o exceptions, namely Canada and, tem porarily , South Africa. In Aus- 
trah a , Xew Zealand and Canada the  gold standard  ceased to  work already 
prior to  Septem ber, 1931. Subsequent steps taken  by the  two dominions 
m the  1 acific differed from those of Canada. The adherence of A ustralia 
and .New Zealand to  the  sterling bloc was a natural process, while Canada 
kej't aloof from  it which was a consequence of her close economic ties 
with the l mted States. The Irish Free S ta te  and Ind ia  also joined the  
bloc, though not w ithout certain internal political complications. South 
Africa joined the bloc m the  closing weeks of 1932. The dominions and 
Ind ia  made their own decisions regarding their adherence to  the  bloc 
but these decisions were, in fact, d icta ted  by th e  dependence of those 
countries on Britain, as well as by political considerations emphasizing the  
m utual in terests of the  Commonwealth countries. The colonies and other 
dependent territo ries of the Em pire were not in a position to  m ake even 
formal decisions. Their subordination to  Britain reflected the tru e  aspect 
of B ritish rule. In addition to  the  hard core of the  sterling bloc, there 
were certain o ther European, African and Asian countries outside the 
British Em pire which joined it. Their decisions in respect- of the  adher­
ence to  the  bloc were influenced by considerations sim ilar to  those of 
the  dominions.
M onetary cooperation w ithin the  sterling bloc was based on unw rit­
ten rules. and the  cohesive force of the  bloc was exerted by the  former 
world currency, sterling. This cohesive force was, in fact, economic pres­
sure. but a t the same tim e the bloc ensured to  its members protection 
from  the anarchy of the  world m arket and a relative sim plicity of se t­
tling international transactions. Pegging of the  currencies of bloc countries 
to  the  pound signified a continuation ofpre-1931 arrangem ents ad justed  
to  changed conditions. The form er world currency became a means 
of paym ent flowing freely w ithin the  sterling bloc, which was convertible 
in to  o ther currencies and for which gold could be purchased at prevailing 
m arket prices. A significant portion of world trad e  continued to  be settled 
in pounds, a fact th a t helped to  m aintain  its leading role, though to  a 
lim ited ex ten t. The value of the  currencies of member countries rem ained 
stable m term s of the  pound, which contribu ted  to  a  s ta te  of relative 
security w ithin the bloc. These countries accum ulated their currency
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reserves in pounds which cem ented British m onetary hegemony over bloc 
members. This hegemony was realized by th e  operation of the wide n e t­
work of banks, w ith its  centre in London.
As a  rule the sterling bloc has been characterized by the  bourgeois 
lite ra tu re  as an exam ple of vo luntary  cooperation and common sense, 
based upon the  realization of m utual advantages. It has often been as­
serted th a t the  bloc was functioning satisfactorily despite the fact that no 
formal agreem ents had been signed, it did not possess a  cent ral machinery 
or s ta tu tes, but came in to  being spontaneously, and its existence was 
supported by British trad itions and by the  advantages of convenient a r ­
rangem ents.'Thus, the  sterling bloc has been described as an ideal solution, 
as a  peaceful island, a ttacked  in vain by the  waves of the  world economy. 
The reality was. however, far from  being ideal. The sterling bloc was a 
solution which the  countries in question were forced to  accept. L i to rts  
aim ed at achieving independence were rendered meaningless by the eco­
nomic pressure brought to  bear upon them , and by the lack of economic 
m atu rity , indispensable to  an independent m onetary policy. Conditions 
required for the  m aintenance of some sort of a retormeu gold standard  
(the first alternative) were lacking, too. By insisting on gold, the countries 
in question would have been transferred  to  a heterogeneous camp con­
sisting of sta tes w ith which they  had no economic ties at all. or only oc­
casional ones. They would have been compelled to  acquiesce m the d e te ­
rioration of their economic relations, fu rther in the consequences of 
their overvalued currencies, viz. the  drying up of their exports and the 
increase of their im ports, and finally in the  depreciation of t heir reserves 
held in sterling. This s ta te  of affairs would have led inevitably to  adm in­
istrative  regulations in respect of their international paym ents and to  
m onetarv and trade  restrictions. The countries in question were obviously 
not in a position to  run th is risk. They were incapable of freeing them ­
s e lv e s  from  the  dependence on London.13
The Consequences of dependence on Britain were felt by the  mem­
bers of the  British Commonwealth in th e  field of trade  as well. 1 lie pre­
lude to  the new British commercial policy was the  Im port Duties Act o 
M arch 1 1932. U nder the  Act protective duties were levied on m anufac­
tu red  goods but im ports from the British Commonwealth were exem pted. 
London thus began to  erect discrim inatory pro tective tariff walls around 
the  Em pire. These steps were, in fact, a belated answer to  the excessively 
protectionist Hawley-Smoot T ariff Act th a t  'mid neen passe., in 
in the  U nited  S tates. The bulk of the  exports of t he dominions to  Britain 
consisted of foodstuffs and raw m aterials, so th a t the  provision relating 
to  exem ption from  protective duties was of little  practical value to  the 
members of the  Commonwealth. As' Bruce, Delegate of A ustralia, put it. 
th e  preferences gran ted  under the  Act were “a  somewhat ta rd y  response 
for the  benefits from A ustralia  long enjoyed by British industry . 
The words of Bruce indicated  th a t the  dominions dem anded gains on 
the  British m arket, in re tu rn  for their services.
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The Imperial Conference, held in Ottawa in the middle of 1932, 
was a further step towards establishing a system of British protectionism! 
1 lie aim was stated by Baldwin, Head of Delegation of the United King­
dom. to be "to clear out the channels of trade among ourselves”.15 Bald­
win deemed it advisable to stress that the purpose of the new British 
commercial policy was not to isolate the Em]lire from the rest of the 
world. As he put it, “there are two ways in which increased preference 
can be given -  either by lowering barriers among ourselves or by rais­
ing them against others.” By suggesting adoption of the first method 
Baldwin wanted to convince the capitalist world, which watched with 
vivid interest the Ottawa events, that the method as suggested by him 
was not detrimental to countries outside the Empire, while the second 
alternative would injure the interests of such countries. It was obvious, 
however, that an improvement of intra-Empire trade was bound to wors­
en the trade relations of member countries of the preferential system 
with the rest of the world, whatever method of preferential treatment 
was to be chosen. The general statement of principle, adopted in Ottawa, 
evaded this fact. According to the wording of this statement, “by the' 
lowering or removal of barriers among themselves. . . the flow of trade 
between the various countries of the Empire will be facilitated, and . . . by 
the consequent increase of the purchasing power of their peoples the trade 
of the world will also be stimulated and increased”.16
The essence of the preferential ta r iff  system , established in O ttaw a, 
was reflected, however, by the  term s of the  agreem ents concluded ra th e r 
than  by declarations. 1 he ta r iff  area th a t  came into being was not based 
on m utual advantages. It intensified, to  the advantage of Britain and to  
the detrim ent of the  rest of the  area, the  existing inequalities in in tra- 
E m pire trade. A t the  same tim e, Im perial protectionism  created  a new 
kind of effective discrim ination at the expense of the  rest of the  world. 
Thus, the  newly born system  contribu ted  to  the disintegration process 
of the  capitalist world.
I he said inequalities were obvious from  the outset. The dominions were 
called upon by London not to  impose, on goods im ported from  the  U n it­
ed K ingdom , higher duties than  necessary to  protect “reasonably effi­
cient dom estic industries. Thus, London w anted to  reduce to  the  lowest 
possible level the  com petition of the  relatively underdeveloped industries 
of the dominions, and in tended to  afford possibility for a rb itra ry  in te r­
pretations o f the criteria  of “efficiency”. At the  same tim e, the  dom in­
ions were not gran ted , as a  rule, du ty  reductions bu t were assured of the  
m aintenance of existing benefits, viz. free entry  of certain  goods or pref- 
eiential trea tm en t of others, in the  U nited Kingdom . In connection 
with certain  agricultural produce for which quotas had been fixed by the 
l  nited Kingdom, adequate  shares in im ports were prom ised to  the  do­
minions. bu t in determ ining such shares the  in terests of producers in the 
U nited Kingdom  were to  be safeguarded.
Measures taken  subsequently in respect of the rest of the  world 
contradicted  the  principle th a t had been enunciated by Baldwin in
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O ttaw a. The operation of tho preferential system  was based on disad­
vantages to  be borne by the  rest of the world. A considerable portion 
of th e  benefits accorded by Britain to  the Commonwealth was ensured 
by imposing new or increased duties on sim ilar goods im ported from the 
rest of the  world, and  the  dom inions d id  the  same in a num ber of cases. 
The agreem ents concluded by the  United Kingdom with the dominions 
were to  run for five years, w ithout the possibility of their term ination 
prior to  expiry. This arrangem ent served to  strengthen  the  system , but 
it was a blow to t  he rest of the  world because it predicted  lasting discrim ­
ination at the  expense of ex tra-E m pire countries. These countries were 
also hit by an O ttaw a resolution to  the effect “th a t no tre a ty  obligations 
in to  which they  (viz. the contracting  parties) might en ter in the fu ture 
should be allowed to  interfere with any m utual preference which Govern­
m ents of the  Commonwealth might decide to  accord to  each other, and 
th a t they  would free t hemselves from existing treaties, if any, which might 
so interfere” .17 The U nited Kingdom defended the  bloc, established by 
means of th e  preferential tariffs and the  cohesive force of the pound 
sterling, also w ith the  application of th e  m ost-favoured-nation principle, 
though in a  d isto rted  in terp re ta tion . »She made it impossible for foreign 
countries to  lav a claim, on the  streng th  of the m ost-favoured-nation 
principle, on th e  ta r iff  ra tes  established in O ttaw a, but on her part she 
was dem anding all the  benefits accorded by o ther countries to  each other, 
by referring to  the  m ost-favoured-nation principle.
Foreign trad e  of Britain reflected in the th irties a process as shown
hereunder:18
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The above data demonstrate two tendencies. The proportion of 
tho trade of the United Kingdom with the rest of the Empire increased 
while that with foreign countries outside the preferential system decreased. 
Vet, in addition to the Ottawa agreements, there were other factors 
at work, too. Thus, the above trend cannot be attributed solely to the 
operation of the preferential system. Such factors were the following: 
the depreciation of sterling, facilitating British exports to. and hindering 
British imports from, the rest of the world: l lie gradual recovery of the 
British economy; the price increases of certain raw materials on the world 
market. The effect of these factors could not be measured separately; 
their existence parallel with the operation of the preferential system made 
it impossible to analyze the working of the latter, separated from other 
fact ors.
The United S tates b itterly  objected to  the  O ttaw a agreem ents, and 
regarded t he British ta r iff  system  as an a ttack  upon the  un ity  of the  world 
economy. In v irtue of the  Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 
•June 12. 1934, the  Roosevelt A dm inistration adopted  the  principle of 
non-discrim ination, and proclaimed the policy of “new free tra d e ” based 
on equal opportunities. W ashington condemned all artificial barriers 
which paralyzed international trade  and ham pered the  operation of 
"natural forces” th a t had facilitated the flow of trad e  in the  p a s t. The 
American trade  policy promised the  liberalization of in ternational com­
merce by means o f gradual reductions of ta r iff  rates. Behind the W ashing­
ton doctrine tha t appealed to  the  capitalist world there were two connected 
tendencies. In the  fourth  decade of the 20th century  it was no longer 
the  British interests which dem anded the revival of the  idealized s ta te  
of affairs of pre-1914 decades. American in terests were in need of the  
doctrine. The superiority of American goods, supported by technological 
progress, was about to  become incontestable on the  world m arket, but 
the  trade  barriers erected throughout the world prevented th e  realization 
of t his superiority. However, those barriers stood in th e  way of the  export 
offensive o f other capitalist countries as well. Thus, the  elim ination of the 
barriers seemed to  be a common interest. It was asserted by protagonists 
of trade  liberalization th a t national efforts, aim ed at self-sufficiency, im­
peded a rational use of productive forces and the international division 
of labour: hence it was impossible to  achieve the levelling of economic 
relations and the  consolidation of the  capitalist world. On account of the 
shift in the  balance of power which had taken  place to  the detrim ent of 
European capitalist sta tes, the U nited States was bound to  become the 
leader of the  norm alization process of capitalist economic relations. This 
role implied paving the  way for American economic expansion. In  add i­
tion, it implied serving the  prospects of the consolidation process of the 
capitalist world order. \ e t ,  American monopoly capital disregarded the  
fact th a t  the conditions of the  th irties were far from being favourable for 
laying th e  foundations of trade  relations, based upon non-discrim ination 
and freed from restrictions. It wanted to  force its trade  doctrine upon the 
capitalist world a t a tim e when the  depression-hit capitalist countries,
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overburdened with war debts, defended th e  rem ainder of their gold and 
foreign exchange reserves bv means of an arsenal of trade  and 1 nonetai \ 
restrictions, and were forcibly developing their dom estic industries and 
agricultural production behind protective walls.
Though the  main target of American assaults was the  British pref­
erential system , the  U nited S tates a ttacked  with sim ilar vehemence the 
bilateral agreem ents concluded by Britain with European and Latin 
American countries. W ashington regarded these agreem ents as products 
of bilateralism , and condem ned t hem in t he name of t he American doctrine 
of m ultilateralism . The “new free tra d e ” was opposed to  the  practice 
of forcing trade  into the narrow channels of bilateral relations, and 
rejected  balancing of accounts between pairs of countries. Bilateralism, 
it was asserted in W ashington, destroyed the  unity  of world m arket, nar­
rowed and distorted  the flow of international trade  and paym ents, bred 
discrim ination. S ta te  intervention was accused of paralyzing in ternation­
al com petition and fostering inefficient economic activities behind pro­
tec tive  walls, and all these charges were linked with the  disavowal of 
bilateralism . British m ethods of bilateralism  were assailed by the  United 
S tates because Britain w anted to  acquire larger shares of the  shrinking 
world m arket than  she was deemed to  be en titled  to. Further, W ashing­
ton resented the  fact th a t, in v irtue of the  agreem ents concluded, the 
United Kingdom was capable of ensuring a relative stab ility  to  the sys­
tem  of her bilateral arrangem ents, and of extending her influence beyond 
the  sterling bloc and the  preferential system . W ashington paid particu ­
lar a tt ent ion to  British-German economic relations which were develop­
ing steadily , while Am erican-German relations were deteriorating. 
11"objected vigorously to  the  British-Germ an paym ents agreement, con­
cluded in 1934, because it accorded advantages to  British .creditors a t 
the  expense of American ones.
Washington condemned forcefully the bilateral trade and payments 
practices, employed by Fascist Germany, too. Relevant measures were 
accompanied by steps denouncing Nazi political policies. This subject 
does not fall within the scope of this paper.
A fter 1933 the  W est was divided in  tw o cam ps in respect of the main 
features of economic and m onetary policy. 1'he l nited States, Britain, 
and the countries under their influence were form ing one camp. Freed 
from  the shackles of th e  gold standard  these countries were availing t hem- 
selves of the  opportunities offered by the  depreciation of their currencies, 
and were giving im petus to  the recovery of their national economies by 
expansionist domestic economic policies. A common feature of these poli­
cies of the  two leading W estern countries was th a t m onetary measures were 
accompanied by various devices of s ta te  regulation, thus giving incentive 
to  home production and d istribu tion . The m ethods differed however. 
The other camp was the  so-called gold bloc, the  hard  core of which con­
sisted of France, Belgium, the N etherlands, Switzerland, and, for some
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time, Italy. These countries insisted on maintaining the gold standard, and 
had to resort, as a consequence of their decision, to restrictive domestic 
economic policies.
Am erican economic penetrat ion was resisted not only by the  econom­
ic bloc led by B ritain . The gold bloc countries, m ainly France, were 
standing  in the  way of th is penetration, too. The depreciating dollar was 
a form idable th rea t, and France tried to  neutralize the  pressure of Am er­
ican goods by imposing im port restrictions. It was of vital im portance, 
it was held in W ashington, to  do away with the French barriers. F rance, 
on her p art, was interested in halting the  depreciation of th e  dollar. As a 
consequence of the  failure of the  1933 W orld Economic Conference the  
Am erican-French controversy rem ained unsettled , and was em bittered  
by the  negative French a ttitu d e  regarding the  repaym ent of debts owed 
to  the  U nited States.
By maintaining the gold standard, the countries of the gold bloc 
had to acquiesce in the relative overvaluation oft heir currencies.'Phis stim­
ulated imports into the bloc. Simultaneously with defending themselves 
against the inflow of goods from countries with depreciating currencies, 
t he members of the gold bloc made efforts to encourage trade among them­
selves. Yet, such efforts were of no avail because the national economies 
of t he gold bloc countries were not complementary. Trade interests clashed 
within the bloc, mainly on account of the aggressive French export 
policy. Intra-gold bloc trade, with all its deficiencies, could not make up 
for economic relations with the rest of the world. The gold bloc was an 
island, trying to lessen dependence on the world market that was divided 
on account of the struggle between the United States and Britain, but at 
the same time intra-gold bloc trade was an imperfect channel which fell 
short of expectations.
Gold bloc countries were adopting domestic economic policies 
which were opposed to  those of W ashington and London. While the  
la tte r  were carrying out expansionary measures, the  gold bloc s ta tes  
were tu rn ing  down consistently currency depreciation th a t was deemed 
to  lead inevitably to  inflation. Consequently, they  had to  choose the  a l­
ternative  of deflation. The results were economic stagnation, chronic 
unem ploym ent, and worsening political tension, the  la tte r being a charac­
teristic  of France. Though the  failure of deflationary  m easures was ob­
vious, the gold bloc countries continued to  insist on the  illusion th a t 
th e  gold standard  was a symbol, moreover the safeguard, of stab ility . 
They were not prepared to  adm it th a t  the gold standard , called „golden 
calf” by Keynes, ceased to  function as an inleniational s tandard , and be­
came a fetish of a  few' countries only, leading to  stagnation instead of 
stab ility . I t  was disregarded th a t  the gold standard  ceased to  operate in 
th e  trad itional way even w ithin the  bloc itself. The considerable gold 
stocks of countries adhering to  th e  bloc19 were facilitating the  observa­
tion of the rules of the  game, as prescribed by the  post-w ar version of the 
gold standard . Yet, the  criteria, which had characterized the  operation 
of the  trad itional gold standard  in pre-1914 days, were lacking, viz. the
P R E L U D E  T O  E C O N O M IC  C O O P E R A T IO N  8 9
freedom  of international trade , high levels of economic activ ity  and em ­
ploym ent, ample credit, internal circulation of gold, unlim ited con­
version.
'fhe gold bloc was established with a declaration signed bv six coun­
tries on .July 3, 1933, the very day when the „bombshell message” of 
Roosevelt created an almost hysterical atmosphere at the World Econom­
ic Conference. The declaration confirmed the monetary cooperation 
between the signatory countries, and was, in fact, a response to the failure 
of the Conference.20 In autumn, 1934, the gold bloc reaffirmed its loyalty 
to gold, but the published documents contained a new element, too. In­
ternational cooperation, and the fact that the operation of the gold 
standard was but one factor contributing to the economic recovery of 
the world, were strongly emphasized. The documents called for the inten­
sification of trade contacts, both within the bloc and with the rest of the 
world.21
The em phasis on trad e  contacts with the  rest of the  world was a 
vague gesture addressed to the  United S tates which had already given 
up  th e  1933 m onetary policy and had proclaimed the  liberalization of in te r­
national trade. B ut t he gold bloc continued to  insist on gold, and worldwide 
restoration of the  gold standard  was regarded as the  best avenue to  in ter­
national cooperation. Yet, subsequent developm ents proved th a t the  
hopes in respect of an Am erican retu rn  to  gold were unfounded, and th a t 
Britain rejected the restoration  of pre-1931 conditions. I’lie gold bloc 
was dearly  on the  defensive.
France had the  worst experiences with the operation of the gold 
standard . The short-lived governm ents were unable to  m aster t he chao t­
ic economic situation. O verhasty measures were adopted. Rigid defla­
tionary  steps were followed by promises regarding credit expansion and 
stim ulation of the  economy, coupled with deflationary devices. The Laval 
governm ent which had taken office on Ju n e  7.1935.was given full au tho r­
ity  in the field of finances. 11 issued a num ber of decrees aimed at a com­
prehensive system  of deflationary measures. The main objective was to  
avoid devaluation. Econom y in s ta te  expenditures and a network of re­
s tric tive  arrangem ents were deemed to  be the  proper means to  combat 
depression. This policy had disastrous consequences. Unemployment 
increased, the  volume of construction fell back to  the  half of the 193o 
level, the  ou tpu t of base m aterials declined, foreign trade  decreased to  
one th ird  of the  1929 value, about 20 per cent, of the  gold stocks had to  be 
sacrificed. The bank-rate  was raised to  6 per cent., which held back eco­
nomic ac tiv ity .22 The restrictive economic- policy was accom panied by a 
protectionist im port policy. The level of French tariffs was on the  increase 
since 1919. Due to  the  fact that under the  conditions-of depression the  
tariffs  did not provide adequate  protection, the  Government introduced 
qu an tita tiv e  lim itations of im ports; by th e  middle of the th irties, out 
of 7000 item s of the ta r iff  schedule 3000 were liable to  quan tita tive  limi­
ta tio n , of which tw o th irds were m anufactured goods. The extent of the 
quotas depended upon the  benefits obtained for French exports.23 Thus,
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France followed the same tactics as the United States. She manoeuvred 
with the granting of quotas, while the United States did the same with 
import duty reductions.
The situation  in the  rest of the  gold bloc was sim ilar. L iving under the 
pressure of gold dogm atism  these countries were unable to  find  an a lte r­
native to  deflation. Their economies seemed to  move in a  magic circle; 
restrictions, introduced to  im proving the situation , led to  more com plicat­
ed circum stances. Belgium was the  weakest am ong bloc countries. 
(Ita ly  in troduced exchange control in 1934, so th a t she was no longer 
regarded as a member of the  bloc, despite the  formal m aintenance of the  
gold standard .) Belgium was unable to  resist the  repeated a ttacks  of spec­
u lato rs on the franc, and was forced to  devalue. The 28 per cent, devalu­
ation did not im prove the situation , however.
Developm ents within the gold bloc dem onstrated th a t  the  economic 
policies of the  member countries were unsuccessful. The gold standard  
did not ensure stab ility  of the  exchanges; crises occurred frequently . 
Domestic and foreign capital persistently  speculated for the  fall of gold 
bloc currencies. Occasionally, there  was a panic; currencies of bloc m em ­
bers were sold on a large scale, and there was a massive outflow  of gold. 
The indicators warned that economic developm ents w ithin the  bloc were 
the  opposite of those which characterized the situation  in the countries 
th a t  had  left gold. In the period under review, industrial ou tput increased 
by 50 per cent, in the  sterling bloc and by 25 per cent, in th c  United States, 
while i t  rose by 12 per cent, in th e  gold bloc. The num ber of unem ­
ployed increased in the gold bloc, but in Britain and the  U nited  S tates 
it decreased. Similar contrasts characterized the  trends of foreign trade.'-4
I he chronic crisis of the gold bloc produced a paradoxical phenomenon. 
The vulnerability of gold bloc currencies caused anxiety in W ashington 
and London. It was held that the devaluation of those currencies might 
give a fresh impetus to the struggle on the world market. Therefore, the 
United States and Britain extended temporary assistance to the endangered 
currencies. The same was done by the Bank for International0Set­
tlements in Basle.rI hus, the leading capitalist powers which had left gold 
came to the rescue of their competitors. The maintenance of the gold 
standard in o th e r  countries became an important task for those who had 
abandoned i t .
Events following the Great Depression furnished sufficient evidence 
that no lasting results could be expected of national efforts aimed at 
self-sufficiency, and that such efforts were frustrated by developments 
which took place elsewhere. The experiences pointed to the interdepend­
ence of the countries in the West. Net. the fact that the consolidation 
of the economies of Western democracies required the elimination of 
autonomous measures, and the adoption of new forms of cooperation, 
was not readily realized.
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Cooperation became the  order of th e  day. This was substan tia ted  
by world politics, too. In  1935, the  Fascist s ta tes  provoked twice th e  
W est. The unilateral repudiation of the  m ilitary provisions of the Ver­
sailles T reaty  as well as the  unprovoked a ttack  on E th iop ia  furnished 
evidence in respect of the  aspirations of the  Fascist powers. However, 
the  political policies of th e  W estern democracies did not come up to  the  
exigencies of the tim e. The fundam ental principles of Am erican foreign poli­
cy were non-involvem ent in in ternational conflicts, and „ im partia l” neu­
tra lity , as codified in the  neutrality  legislation. The tw o leading s ta tes  of 
the  League of N ations, F rance and Britain, sought modus vivendi with the 
Fascist powers. As a result of the steps of the  West the  cracks in the  ed i­
fice of the  postw ar international order incessantly widened. Vet, the  
necessity of cooperation came to  be realized, though retarded  by W estern 
policies.
'I'he key to  economic cooperation between W estern democracies 
was in W ashington. The m itigation of the  disequilibrium , in fact the main 
problem  of economic relations, depended on the  American a ttitu d e , and 
required American initiatives in the  fields of exchanges, finance, and trade. 
The dilem m a of finances had its roots in the  World W ar. The painfully 
built s truc tu re  of war debts and reparations broke down in 1932 — 33. 
The debtor countries were anxious to  know as to  w hether W ashington 
would be prepared to  give up American claims in respect of the  war debts, 
in th e  interest of a more balanced world economy. They also held out a 
hope of a renewal of American capital outflow which had given im petus 
to  the  recovery of the  rest of the  capitalist world in the  twenties, but 
came to  a  standstill in 1929 — 30. In  th e  field of m onetary policy the  coun­
tries of W estern Europe were w aiting for the cessation of American ex­
perim entation, in the interest of sound m onetary relations which, it was 
held by m any, were to  bring about the  revival of the  gold standard , 
though reformed to  some ex ten t. Finally, th ey  were anxious to  see the  
excessive protectionism  of the  Republican era discarded.
W hat was W ashington’s response?
So far as war debts were concerned W ashington rem ained adam ant. 
A radical solution, i.e. cancellation, of the debts would have required  
Congressional approval, but the  isolationist mood of th e  country ruled 
out such an a ttitu d e  at Capitol Hill. The Roosevelt A dm inistration had 
to  avoid a show-down in Congress, bu t a p a rt from  this it did not intend 
to  change the  policies of its predecessor in th is respect. The Johnson Act, 
passed in 1934, which forbade the extension of credits to  countries in de­
fault on their debts, was a blow to  those who held out a hope of a 
renewal of American capital outflow. Aimed at punishing recalcitrant 
debtors, the  Johnson Act intensified the isolationist mood. In the  field of 
commercial policy, W ashington proclaimed the  trade  liberalization pro­
gram , associated w ith Secretary of S ta te  Hull. However, im plem entation 
of the  program  proved to  be a slow process. In the  first years, the  trad e  
agreem ents were concluded mostly w ith countries of secondary im por­
tance. The significance of such agreem ents fell short of expectations of
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W ashington. Thus, th e  program  inspired m ainly tlie representatives of 
orthodox economic thought, who regarded it as a  lever of prospective 
liberalization of world trade . On the  other hand, the  em phasis on export 
prom otion, and on th e  prim acy of American exports, a larm ed those in 
favour of m itigation of world economic disequilibrium . The chief rival, 
B rita in , was ra th e r cautious when she was approached by W ashington, 
suggesting trade  talks.
The prospects of m onetary  cooperation were not brighter either. 
The undervalued dollar rem ained a perm anent menace to  in ternational 
economic relations, and con tribu ted  to  a persistent American export 
surplus which had to  be settled ultim ately  in gold. One of the  sources of 
th e  massive gold flow to  the  U nited S tates was, then, the  undervalued 
dollar. O ther sources were speculation and the  flight of cap ital from  over­
seas countries in search of security. As a result of these factors the  value 
of Am erican gold stocks rose from  8.238 million dollars in 1034 to  10,125 
million dollars a year la te r, and to  11,258 million dollars at the  end of 
1936.25 The large gold quan tities which reached th e  U nited S tates were 
nui allowed, however, to become the stim ulan ts of Am erican credit ex ­
pansion, hoped for in the  rest of the  capitalist world. The A dm inistration 
took  steps with a view to  preventing the  gold inflow from  exerting in fla­
tionary  pressure. Consequently, foreign gold was in fact „sterilized” , 
and  did not swell the  Am erican credit base. Foreign gold was a dead­
weight to  the U nited States, while it was badly needed elsewhere. The 
flow of gold to  the U nited S tates aggravated the  inequalities in the  d is­
trib u tio n  of the  capitalist w orld’s gold, th u s  intensifying disequilibrium .
From  t he foregoing it appears th a t  in the  first tw o years of the  Roose­
velt A dm inistration the  U nited S ta tes gave little  evidence of her readiness 
to  assume the  role of the  stim ulant of in ternational economic coopera­
tion. Still less was she prepared to  make sacrifices in order to  lessen dis­
equilibrium . This a ttitu d e  was based on the  economic considerations of 
the  New Deal. The sta tem ent of Roosevelt, made on the  occasion of his 
inauguration in March, 1933, was still valid. Accordingly, practical policy 
requ ired  “the  p u tting  of first things f irs t” . 'Die A dm inistra tion’s efforts 
had to  be concentrated  on the  slow and  painful process of recovery.
The doctrine of neutrality was another powerful factor retarding 
American initiatives in respect of international economic cooperation. 
The State Department was responsible for the enforcement of the doctrine 
of* ncutrcility, and it kept a f*i!*!ii hand on thin task. Secretary Hull was 
anxious to be on good terms with Congress. He frequently called the 
attention of the President to the balance of forces in Congress,recommend­
ing restraint in connection with certain steps of the Executive. This, in 
fact, amounted to warnings in respect of the isolationist mood at Capitol 
Hill. For Hull, there was only one field of economic relations which really 
mattered. It was foreign trade. In his view, a consistent implementation 
of his program was by itself a remedy for the ills of the world economy. 
He was not interested in other spheres of economic relations, viz. moneta­
ry and financial matters, which fell within the competence of the Treasury
P R E L U D E  T O  E C O N O M IC  C O O P E R A T IO N  9 3
This division of labour was an obstacle to  a  consistent foreign econom­
ic policy. S trained relations between the  two M inisters had the same 
effect. M orgenthau, the  dynam ic Secretary of T reasury, who was on 
friendly term s w ith the  P resident, objected to  the  overcautious policies 
of Hull which, he asserted, hindered a more active American foreign 
policy. M orgenthau was particularly  irrita ted  bv the  pro-B ritish a ttitu d e  
of Hull, and Roosevelt shared the  views of th e  Secretary of Treasury. The 
President held th a t  the  chief rival and opponent of the  American foreign 
economic policy was Britain. Also his foreign policy considerations were 
more akin to  those of M orgenthau, who was a consistent enemy of F as­
cism, while Hull was less outspoken. As a result of th e  division of labour 
w ithin the  Government M orgenthau had to  be content with m onetary 
m atters in the  field of foreign economic policy. Consequently, he tried  to  
consolidate W estern cooperation in the  m onetary field, thus con tribu t­
ing to  the  strength  of the  Occident.
As from  1935, M orgenthau began to  hold the  view th a t the position 
of th e  dollar was dependent on foreign developm ents. He paid a tten tion  
to  exchange ra te  changes of the  French franc and the  pound. The problem 
of exchange stabilization was viewed from  a different angle. He became 
sceptical in respect of the  W arren theory . He refused to  raise again th e  
gold price, and contended th a t a higher price might compel the  countries, 
still on the  gold standard , to  devalue. M orgenthau opined th a t such a 
process would lead to  an appreciation of the  dollar, endangering thereby  
the  com petitiveness of American goods. His favourite idea was an Ameri­
can-French “stabilization en ten te” , to  which B ritain  might adhere in 
due course. Explaining his plan to  the  French Am bassador, he stressed 
t hat the  United S tates and France, possessing the  bulk of the  gold stocks 
of the  world, were in a position to  induce B ritain  to  join the  “en ten te .”26
W ith the  approval of Roosevelt M orgenthau began to  act. In  his 
radio address of May 18. 1935, he m ade it clear th a t the United S tates 
would not prevent a prospective exchange stabilizat ion, should conditions 
become ripe for i t . This announcem ent was the  first American official decla­
ration in international m onetary m atters since the  summ er of 1933. and 
was received w ith mixed feelings abroad. The readiness to  cooperate was 
greeted  w ith enthusiasm  by those in favour of developing economic rela­
tions. They considered it as a turning-point in American m onetary policy. 
O thers were puzzled by the sta tem ent of M orgenthau to  the effect th a t  
the  United States was not prepared to  give up the right to  change the  
gold content of the  dollar.27 The assertion of freedom of action roused 
unpleasant memories: The American in itiative was answered by London 
with polite u tterances which, in fact, am ounted to  a refusal. In  his s ta te ­
ment of May 16. Cham berlain. Chancellor of the  Exchequer, declared 
th a t  the  effects of the  cheap-money policy and of th e  m oderate tariffs 
were about to  be felt at the  tim e. He went on saying th a t  one of the  main 
objectives of Britain was stabilization; but “it is no use to  try  to  anchor 
a  ship if the  anchorage is always slipping”.28 The gist of these words was 
clear. It was economic recovery, progressing w ith  th e  help of the  econom-
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if policy th a t  had been in troduced in 1031 — 32, which was of param oun t 
im portance to  Britain. Therefore, the  Governm ent was no t prepared to  
sacrifice th e  results, m ade possible by Im perial protectionism , internal 
credit expansion, and the  skillful m anaging of th e  pound. Of course, 
Chamberlain did not speak of the  fact th a t it was Britain which was 
responsible, to  a significant ex ten t, for the unstab le „anchorage“ -  the 
m onetary situation  of th e  capitalist world.
The reaction of London convinced M orgenthau th a t B ritain , suspi­
cious of American in itiatives, m ight be influenced indirectly only. He 
concentrated  his a tten tion  on the  French franc which faced again a crisis 
when the Flandin Governm ent fell in May, 1935. Jn order to  p reven t 
ano ther wave of devaluation he made available, out of the  money of the 
Stabilization Fund, a credit of 200 million dollars to  th e  Bank of France, 
saving thereby the franc for a tim e. At the Basle conference of the  Gover­
nors of European central banks the  American action was considered as 
an encouraging step  tow ard do frictn stab ilization .29 American measures 
began to  be trusted  again, Yet, the French franc rem ained vulnerable, 
and speculators continued to  spread rum ours concerning the  inevitable 
devaluation of the franc. The m arch of German troops in to  the Rhine­
land and  the  repudiation of the  Locarno Pact by Germ any in March, 
1936, as well as the  signs of coming in ternal political changes in France, 
gave fresh stim ulus to  a hysterical flight of capital from  France. The 
Bank of France lost gold, between May 29 and Ju n e  5, to  the  value of 
1500 million francs.30
*
The elections in France secured the v ictory  of the  People’s F ron t 
1 he Blum Government promised large-scale economic and  social refo rm s 
economic recovery, and discarding of deflationary policies. It rejected 
devaluation as well. On Ju n e  6 th e  Prime M inister s ta ted  in the  National 
Assembly th a t the  Government intended to  prom ote recovery by pro­
viding am ple credit.
Though the  Blum Government publicly condem ned devaluation 
because of the  inflationary effect, th e  possibility thereof was exam ined 
already in the  first days of its tenure  of office. Behind the  scenes Vincent 
Auriol. M inister for Finance, conducted negotiations at the  Paris Embassy 
of the U nited States. M orgenthau was glad to  receive the  inform ations 
of the  American Em bassy, and encouraged the  French in itia tive  through 
Cochran, Secratary to  the  Em bassy. W ashington was of the  opinion th a t  
the situation was suitable for concluding a  dollar-pound-frane exchange 
stabilization agreem ent. but in view of the  isolationist mood of the country 
and th e  coming Presidential elections it did not w ant to  take  th e  lead. 
The A dm inistration, first of all M orgenthau, held th a t  m onetary cooper­
ation was bound to  cement solidarity of the W est. M orgenthau com pared 
the  European situation  to  the  days when “ Marcia su R om a” had taken 
place, or to  those of early 1933 in Germany.31 He was inclined to  overes­
tim ate  the  political significance of the  “m onetary en ten te” , and opined
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th a t  a  tr ip a rtite  agreement might prevent th e  advance of Fascism, 
by strengthening W estern cooperation. Also dom estic considerations 
spoke for a tr ip a rtite  agreem ent. The conservative opposition of the  New 
Deal and t he financial circles were launching 1 heir offensive. The Supreme 
Court recently declared the  provisions of the  A gricultural Adjustm ent 
Act and the  N ational Industria l Recovery Act unconstitutional. The 
Government had to  furnish evidence, prior to  the elections, th a t it 
was serious about the  stabilization of the dollar, and that m onetary exper­
im entation came definitely to  an end. An exchange stabilization agree­
ment was to  lie the  proper gesture to  placate conservative feelings.
The fact th a t the  Blum Government declared w ar on the defla­
tionary  policies of its predecessors m ade th e  capitalist world believe th a t 
the  French Government would be compelled to  resort to  the  other a lte r­
native, devaluation, or to  introduce exchange control, as practised 
mainly by Fascist states. The franc was overvalued.32 In strained s itu a ­
tions there were two courses open to  those in charge of the economic- 
policies of W estern countries. One was deflation: various devices of re­
stricting  credit, cu tting  down money incomes and prices, curbing sta te  
expenditure, while the  gold conten t of the  currency was m aintained, 
d'he o ther a lternative was internal credit expansion,stim ulation of dom es­
tic economic recovery, accom panied by devaluation. The French Govern­
ment had  to  make a decision. The capitalist world regarded t he social and 
wage policies of the  Blum Government as a new burden to  be borne by 
the  French economy and as factors contributing to  the  rise of production 
costs. The im plem entation oft he said policies, it was held, made devaluation 
inevitable. The negotiations of Vincent Auriol indicated th a t  the  French 
Government shared such views.
Official American and French plans concerning the  solution of the 
dilem m a of France differed to  a significant ex ten t. W ashington consid­
ered a French devaluation as a step  leading to  the  u ltim ate  aim , m onetary 
cooperation between W estern democracies. By stressing American free­
dom of action the  Treasury w anted to  make clear that, a  tr ip a rtite  agree­
ment would in no way modify the m onetary policy of the  U nited States, 
bu t the partners would be required to  alter theirs. Accordingly, the  agree­
ment should be carried into effect on American term s, but the  in itiative 
should come from  Paris. As to  France, it was a m atter of prestige to  con­
ceal the  inherent weakness of the  franc. The Blum  Government en ter­
ta ined  hopes of an international m onetary agreem ent, to  be in itiated  by 
W ashington and negotiated under its leadership, and the  devaluation 
of the  franc was conceived as a by-product of a general agreem ent.33 
Paris intended to  make the  in ternational agreement a pretext for the  
devaluation, in order to  placate the  French monopoly capital,still impres­
sed by the “Poincare franc” , and the  nation which had voted for the 
People’s Front, promising the improvement of the  standard  of living.
Bv the  sum m er of 1936 a certain  rapprochement took the place of the 
previous British a ttitu d e . London w atched with growing anxiety  the 
French in ternal political situation , and, for fear of the polarization
96 I- LANG
thereof it made enquiries in W ashington concerning th e  possibility of 
converting British dollar holdings in to  gold. In view of t he prospect of a 
íenewed a ttack  on the  franc and a French em bargo on gold exports 
London w anted to  ensure dollar-gold conversion. The approval of Mor- 
genthau dim inished British pressure on French gold stocks.34 This eni
ío  ako’n ű r ; ; ,  I T  a,ter " ' f / ' “ '1 I 1« '  ‘ I*  B ri.bh  governm ent re fu n d  to take part in an American demarche calling upon France to  earrv out
devalim t.on Cham berlain „„¡no,! th a t a jotnl American B r i t .T f „ tn  
vont.on m ,ght have been u«ed by France a» an „ „ „ „ « „ „ ¡ tv  shift!?,, 
Í  d o ? . ° r  rF "R°n ^ i n t e r v e n i n g . 33 He was convinced th a t due 
d e v a lu e ? 11C ( ,ff 'CU ties th e  French Government was not prepared to
viewsF°The°Bb,mer kS Frencl\  ey.®n ts  STO,»ed <<> confirm  C ham berlain’s 
t " S;  'V H m tG,OVf rnm ent (1|<I not make a move. The workers were 
placated  for a while by the  wage increases, collective bargaining the
tro  s T n l ? ?  \  lyS' the  1>ublic works Program, and price con-tiols. A new  s ta te  agency was to  assist farm ers by means of a system  of
guai anteed prices. Industry and commerce were promised credit facilities 
ofhFraai^e°f  JU y ’ 1936’ t0  ensure national control over the  Bank
tl»> f w  there were certain alarm ing developm ents dem onstrating th a t  
Government was unable to  cope with the difficulties. According to 
the  figures of Aunol. the outflow of capital am ounted to  20 000 million 
fn ncs during the  past eighteen months. Due to dom estic and foreign 
polit ical uncertainties gold hoarding was stepped up. The British Exchange 
Equalization Account supported  the franc by purchases of the  French 
currency, bu t these manoeuvres caused heavy gold losses to France due 
o conversions. In the  first half of August French gold am ount ing to  more 
than  13 million pounds per week reached London.37
The Blum Government tried  to  mobilize the money of the public 
by issuing short-term  interest-bearing bonds, to  the amount of 10 000 
n!! f S' ° outcome was disappointing, however: only 4 000 
million francs were subscribed. On Septem ber 23 subscriptions were 
suspended. Securities exported since 1934 and capital held abroad had 
o be declared; acquisition of foreign banknotes was restricted , sales of 
gold coins were prohibited, penalties were imposed on those spreading 
l um ours likely to  underm ine the  stab ility  of the  franc. All the measures 
were of no avail. Events accelerated.
As a fm ,n f t « r í h CiV1' )Vaf  l,reeiPita ted  the flight of capital from France.
As a countci-m easure the bank-rate was raised. The overhastv step  which
was contrary to  cheap-money policies was in terpreted  as a  sign of w eak­
ness but did not stop capital outflow. The money m arket openly specul­
ated for devaluation. I he long delayed step could be no longer postponed 
On Septem ber 8. 1936 the  French .Ministry of Finance subm i/ted  a  pro-' 
visional d ra ft to  the l nited S tates and Britain, containing the princi- 
p e ^ i f  a trip a rtite  agreement. It called for fixing the exchange rates of the 
dollar and the pound, and for the  devaluation of th e  franc. Changes in
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parities were to  be allowed by m utual agreement and as exceptional 
m easures only. T he u ltim ate  aim  was sta ted  to  be re tu rn  to  gold.
T h e  d r a f t  w a s  r e j e c t e d  in W a s h i n g t o n  a n d  L o n d o n .  P a m  w a s  in ­
f o r m e d  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  B r i t a i n  w e re  n o t  p r e p a r e d  t o  f ix  t h e  e x ­
c h a n g e  r a t e s ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  r e t u r n  t o  g o ld  w a s  c o n t r a r y  t o  th e n ;  e c n n o m  
po lic ie s .  T h e i r  m o n e t a r y  f r e e d o m  o f  a c t i o n  w a s  n o t  t o  b e  s a c r i f ic e d  m  t h e  
i n t e r e s t  o f  F r e n c h  p r e s t i g e  c o n s id e r a t i o n s .  '1 he  f r e n c h  p r in c ip le s ,  ' t  w a s  
fe l t  in  b o t h  c a p i t a l s ,  m ig h t  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a  r e t u r n  t o  a  s t a t e  o f  a ^  
w h o s e  ills. v iz .  m a s s  u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  e c o n o m ic  s t a g n a t i o n ,  fa l l  of |' i<cs, 
e t c  ‘ w e r e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  g o ld .  M o r g e n th a u  w a s - a n n o y e d  t h a t  ' ' a d u n g -  
t o n  w a s  no t i n f o r m e d  b y  P a r i s  a b o u t  t h e  p l a n n e d  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  d e v a l u a ­
t io n .  C h a m b e r l a i n  s t a t e d  t h a t  B r i t a i n  w o u ld  r e f r a i n  f r o m  im p o s in g  r e t a l ­
i a t o r y  m e a s u r e s  a g a in s t  t h e  d e v a l u e d  franc ."*
\  new more detailed French d raft was rejected, too. The document 
was based on the  principles of the  first d raft. It envisaged a joint decla­
ration to  he signed bv the  Premiers and Ministers of f in an ce  of the luce 
countries Categorically worded obligations were enum erated, and ti e 
priority  of international cooperation, as opposed to  dom es^e economic 
policy.' was stressed. Only a single sentence of the lengthy text was e 
v o te d  to  the devaluation oft he franc, indicating that in th is con tex t.the  
French move was a subordinate one. This was unacceptable to  W ashing­
ton In  view of dom estic developm ents M orgenthau had t«  proceed cau- 
Uously. AUacks were launched on the m onetary policy of the Adminis­
tra tion  from  tw o directions.
In a letter of Septem ber 2. 1936, Senator Vandenberg, a  leading iso­
lationist expressed concern in respect of gold purchases at 3o do lais per 
ounce In th is  way, he complained, foreign citizens were enabled to  mv 
American securities with the  dollars obtained, while debtor sta tes were 
•n default on their war debts. Thus, th e  A dm inistration w as.n fac t financ­
ing Europe at the  expense of the  American taxpayer Y andenheigs
a l l e g a t io n s  e c h o e d  t h e  views of c o n s e r v a t i v e  b a n k i n g  c i rc le s  a n d  of  i s o l a ­
t i o n i s t s  I n  r e p l v  t o  t h i s  l e t t e r  M o r g e n t h a u  r e j e c t e d  t h e  c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  
t h e  c a u s e  o f  t h e  go ld  f lo w  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  w a s  t h e  p r ice  of g o ld ,  l i ­
st e a d  t h e S e c r e t a r v  o f  T r e a s u r y  s t r e s s e d  t h e  p o l i t ic a l  a n d  e c o n o m ic  u n c e i -  
t a i n t i e s  p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  t h e  e l im i n a t i o n  th e r e o f  w o u ld  c o n t i l b u t e  t a 
c h a n g e  in  t h e  d i r e c t io n  o f  t h e  g o ld  flow.*** T h e  b a n k i n g  c i rc le s  w e re  r ig h t  
in  ' c r i t i c i z in g  t h e  g o ld  in f lo w  w h ic h  a g g r a v a t e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d u e q u i h  »- 
r h i m  a n d  w a s  a  p o t e n t i a l  i n f l a t i o n  d a n g e r .  V e t .  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  w a s  n o t  b a s e d  
o n  c o n c e r n  a b o u t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s e q u i l i b r iu m ,  b u t  r a t h e r  o n  t h e  c o n s  
. l i n n s  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  o p p o s i t i o n .  B e s id e s ,  t h e  b a n k i n g  a i d e s  o b j t
to  the  violation of the  rules of the  game of the gold standard  (viz. the  one- 
w a v  "old flow). Bv s u g g e s t i n g  a change in the direction of he go d f 1 v 
M o m e n thau opened up new vistas which seemed to  be in line w ith the 
desires of the  banking circles. A reduction of the  gold price (the rise of the 
d X  exchange ra te  r e s t i v e l y )  n *  out of . «  ^  'o , .  h .»cvcc. 
This would have been contrary  to  the  aims of the New Beal.
On the  other hand, the new m onetary  policy had to  be defended 
a aniHt those who c ,cl not want to  give up m onetary  experim entation 
to  ra.se the  in ternal price level by means of m onetary devices’ 
Jn order to  placate public opinion Roosevelt m ade clear th a t a ‘tr ip a rtite  
agreem ent would not mean a  retu rn  to  the  gold standard , and the  adhering 
<ounli.es would be free in respect of their decisions concerning the  domes®
a WGnt ° n saying as Allows: „Because we have too much 
gold bullion for American needs, th is will provide an opportunity  for other 
countries to  acquire a  p a r to f  the  excess, thus stim ulating  world t r a d e “"' 
It is notew orthy th a t the A dm inistration stressed the  significance 
of a tw o-w ay flow of gold and of freedom  of action. In doing so it w anted
T, I T  7  I,roJI,L'y acceptable to  conservatives and New Dealers 
alike. I lie sta tem ent of Roosevelt seemed to  pacify the b itter 1 
it emphasise«! the  continuation of domestic price raising policies while 
the  form er could find a hint in the  P resident’s words concern n g th erev iv a ! 
of a  criterion of the  gold standard  mechanism. The fact th a t the new mdne
edle ,P?hcy ,WUS V- l,rom ot® world trade  was acceptable to  all. Those in ter- 
csted m in ternational trad e  rem em bered the prosperity  and  the American 
export offensive of the  twenties, while the  revival of American expoVt
a d e  p r o m i s e d  t o  t h e  p r o t a g o n i s t s  o f  t h e  N e w  D ea l n e w  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
in  s t i m u l a t i n g  d o m e s t i c  r e c o v e r y .  11 t u n n i e s
Despite the  rejection of th e  French proposals th e  conclusion of the  
tn p a i t i te  agreem ent was only a m atte r of tim e. M orgenthau received word 
f “ ul "1° I '1“ " '“ ' of th e  devaluation of the  f r a ™ . T w „
'.‘T ’1/  T ,"  ' | , omt  " f view of the  fu tu re  pe tition  of the  dollar. The
Uitisli au thorities agreed, too. An adequate procedure had to  be found 
enabling the  tw o governm ents to  become parties to  the  proposed t r ip a rtite  
agree,nent. w ithout m odifying economic policies in force a t the  tim e 
M orgenthau solved the dilem m a by stressing the  continuity  of American 
m onetary policy. On Ins instructions a d raft was prepared in the Treasury 
V Inch emphasized tha t the  constant object of American policy, pursued 
in ievent years, was to  m aintain the greatest possible equilibrium  in the
? u ," tr ? at,<r l ?X( ',angeS’ and to  « " rid  the  c rea tio n 'o fT n y 'd is"  tinbance  of th a t system  by American m onetary action. Thus, M orgenthau 
w hitew ashed American measures of 1 9 3 3 -3 4  disregarding tin* ftn t ti,. * 
the  cap italist world still remembered them . However, in the  m onthsw hen
dem anded razing ttie  failure o f H ^W orfd  E ra^m iiT ^^i^ference’from ^the
According to  the  American draft, the  only th ing  which poin ted  to  a
the  v a h m n fih  ‘f  ,n te rn a tl°naI m onetary relations was the  ad justm ent of 
, 1>s X ® f ? the  fr anc>w,llch was to  ensure stab ility  o f t he principal curren­
cies. In  tins context, i t  was France which had to  m odify her m onetarv  
policy by accepting the American platform , aim ed at establishing more
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solid foundations for the stab ility  of international economic relations, 
a „d  bv availing herself of the assistance extended by the  t in te d  States. 
The tex t made no m ention of the  gold standard  or fixed exchange rates 
and the  equilibrium  of the exchanges was referred to  as an undetiny  
aim The draft did away with the  trea ty  form, as suggested by the  French. 
Instead , it was a  declaration, to  be published in sim ilar term s sim ultaneous- 
]V by the three governm ents. Thus, even the  form  contribu ted  to  w eak­
ening the  com m itm ents of the  signatory powers.
On October «, 1936, Cham berlain made a sta tem ent which, b> m 
plication, revealed why the  American draft was acceptable to  ï^ n d o n . 
“Sterling is still free” , he said, “ it is not linked to  gold or to  any othe. 
c u rre n c y ”42 The sta tem ent thus confirm ed th a t freedom of action in 
m onetary  m atters continued to  be one of the fundam ental principles of 
S S f i T i ^ m l o  policy. I. also reflected a  problem of contem porary 
economic thought. The consequences of deflationary  pohems thm  I ad 
been introduced in the  difficult years between 192o and 1931, and  he 
m ie of gold in B ritain , were still rem embered, loo  much inflam m at i . 
m atter,"produced by persistent efforts designed to  m aintain the  exchange 
ra te  of the  overvalued pound, accum ulated in the  course of the said \e .  . • 
Public opinion held the  gold st andard  responsible for t he il ls of t he economy 
of the  1 9 2 5 -3 1  period: deflation, accom panied by the fall of wages and 
prices, unem ploym ent, economic stagnation , were associated with the  
L id  standard . Economic thought a ttem p ted  to  analyze the  developm ent 
of the  process which had culm inated in the fall of the  pound m au tum n 
1 9 3 1  Jt exam ined the interaction of domestic and foieign p in t  1c e .  
on the  one hand, as well as th a t of the  price level and the  exchange ra te , 
on th e  other. It considered the effects oft he bank-rate  policy and the a l­
ternatives of currencies with fixed pa r values and  of managed euiTenc.es 
It investigated the possibilities of equilibrium  below full em ployment 
level. Meanwhile the  British Government continued to  impkmien, | > 
pragm atic policies to  which it had com m itted itself in ->3 32. rl lie
same was done by the  Am erican Government which relied on p o s t-1 .33
experiences.
*
W ashington and London repeatedly emphasized th a t no pressure 
was brought to  bear on Paris. Yet, events proved the contrary . Morgen- 
îh au  informed Auriol to  the  effect th a t  the  only a lternative of concluding 
a trip a rtite  agreem ent was to  accept the  American d raft. During the  pro­
trac ted  talks the  position of the  franc continued to  deteriorate. I he 1 ranch 
Governm ent had to  give up the  idea of a m ultilateral treaty ,- 
m utual obligations, according to  which the devaluation of the franc, 
would have been subordinated to  the  readjustm ent of
The identical tex ts  of the  declarations, made public on September 
25 1936 had a  wording th a t was alm ost bordering on commonplace.
I t did not indicate the ways and means of im plem enting th e  I'nncip es 
concerning m onetary cooperation and exchange stab ility . 1 he only part
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I. M okkaserviee, in der Sam m lung der Krmitage zu Leningrad.
2. I eetasse mil I'n terschale , im Museum der Porzellani'abrik zu Herend.
I
3 . Vase m it Deckel, in der Moclellsammlimg der Porzellanfabrik zu Herend.
Il
4. Prunkschale m it durchbrochenem  H and, in der Sam m lung der K rm itugezu Leningrad.
III
5 . Dessertteller, in der Sam m lung der E rm itage zu Leningrad.
(>. Passe, im Museum der PorzellanlabriU zu Hörend.
I V
i. Durch brochones Ívőrbehen, in «1er Modellsammluug der PorzeUaufabrik zu Herein!.
M acher feller, ini Museum der Porzellanfabrik zu H erend.
V
!(. Flachet- Teller, in dér 
Samm lung '1er E rm itage 
zu Leningrad.
10. Suppenteller, im Museum 
der Porzellanfabrik zu H erend.
VI
1 2 . U ntertasse, in  der 
Sam m lung der E rm itage 
zu Leningr ad.
11. I eller. in der Modellsamm­
lung der Porzollanfabrik zu 
Herend.
13. Prunksehiissel mil zwei H enkeln, in der Sam m lung der E rm itage zu Leningrad.
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of the  tex ts, worded in a  concrete m anner, was the one dealing with 
tlie devaluation of the franc, which was sta ted  to  he welcomed by W ashing­
ton and London. As to  the  m aintenance of equilibrium  in the  system  
of international exchanges, one of the  main objects of W estern mone­
ta ry  cooperation, the tex ts  merely s ta ted  the in ten tion  of the three 
governm ents to  continue to  use th e ir available resources, in order to  
avoid any disturbance of the basis of international exchanges resulting 
from the  read justm ent of the franc. The fact th a t no reta lia to ry  devahu 
ations were permissible under the  agreement could be read between the 
lines only. The agreement had no such proviso. It did contain, however, 
tw o sentences which, in fact, am ounted to  such an in ten tion  of the  con­
trac ting  parties. They read as follows: “The G overnm ents of th e  U nited 
Ktutes, the  l nited Kingdom, and francé , desire and invite the  coopera­
tion o ft lie ot her nations to  realize the  policy laid down in the  present decla­
ration. They tru st t hat no country will a ttem p t to  obtain  an unreasonable 
com petitive exchange advan tage. . . ” As the biographer of M orgenthau put 
it. th is p a it  of the  declarations was inserted in the text at the  instance of 
the  Secretary of Treasury, in order to warn the  Fascist s ta te s .43 Thus, it 
was the  above proviso which informed studen ts of the T ripartite  Mone­
ta ry  Agreement tha t com petitive exchange depreciation, a  form idable 
weapon of the  early th irties, was in fact outlawed for the  future.
'file Agreement did not halt m onetary uncertain ty . On October
1. 1936, the  French Parliam ent approved the  devaluation of th e  franc, 
ranging between 25,2 and 34,4 per cent. The task  of safeguarding the 
stab ility  of the  franc was assigned to  the Exchange Equalization Fund, 
established on the  model of the agencies of the U nited S tates and Britain.' 
The resources of the  Fund am ounted to  10,000 million francs, resulting  
from  the  increase in the  book-value of the gold stocks of the  Bank of 
France. The increase was due to  the devaluation of the  franc; the  gold 
stocks were revalued. Yet, the question as to  what kind of in ternational 
mechanism was to  guard the  operation of the  new system  of m onetary 
relations rem ained unanswered. London and Paris were waiting for W ash­
ing ton’s answer.
A fort night later the American Treasury issued a sta tem en t. The eapi- 
ta lis t world was, at last, informed of the  American in terp re ta tion  of the  
vaguely worded provisions of the  T ripartite  Agreement regarding m on­
etary  cooperation. The Treasury announced th a t  in fu tu re  the  expor­
ta tion  of American gold would be perm itted  for exchange equalization 
accounts or stabilization funds of countries, ready to  offer gold to  be 
purchased by the  U nited S tates a t prices and term s acceptable to  the  
latter. The T reasury further announced the so-called 24-hour policy, 
according to  which the  countries, eligible for the  purchase of American 
gold, would be determ ined daily by the  U nited States. Thus, the perm is­
sion regarding th e  export of American gold could be revoked or a ltered  a t 
any tim e, subject to  a day ’s notice.44
The announcem ent o f  the Treasury in fact proclaim ed a s ta te  o f  
perpetuated  uncertain ty . The fact th a t B ritain  and  France were declared
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eligible for the purchase of American gold did not a lter essentially this 
s ta te  of affairs. The 24-hour policy was a  tactical step , designed to  solve 
th e  dilemm a of the  A dm inistration. The announcem ent of the Treasury 
took the  wind out of the opposition’s sails. The A dm inistration was, 
nam ely, in a position to  point out to  conservative opponents, as well as 
to  protagonists, of the  New Deal th a t th e  l nited S tates did not commit 
herself to  untried  policies of the  newly established m onetary cooperation 
because, by v irtue  of the 24-hour policy, she rem ained free to  act. Those 
devoted to  the gold standard  were enabled to  hope for a re tu rn  to  t he ideal­
ized s ta te  of affairs that hadex isted  prior to  1033. On the other hand, those 
defending New Deal policies could consider the freedom of action of the  
A dm inistration as a safeguard against involvement in international 
m onetary troubles. Another aspect of the  m atter was th a t the  arrange­
m ents of the Treasury made provision for the  exception to  the rule as 
well, in th a t France and Britain were declared eligible for the  purchase 
of American gold. By making th is  provision the U nited States com m itted 
herself to  m onetary cooperation, designed to  prom ote economic collab­
oration on a wider plane, in order to  strengthen the  W est. But the Am er­
ican commitment was double-faced. I he 24-hour policy made it am big­
uous, in th a t it reduced m onetary cooperation to  an ad liar level, thus 
repudiating assum ptions to  the  effect tha t the United States com m itted 
herself definitely to  cooperating w ith W estern Europe.
sji
The T ripartite  Agreement heralded the end of an era, and opened a 
new one. It was t he final act of a period 1 hat had begun in 1931. and touched 
bottom  in 1933. The main features of th e  said period were various m on­
eta ry  manoeuvres, carried out unilaterally  by capitalist sta tes at the  
expense of others, m aking possible tem porary advantages only, and pro­
voking retaliation. Those m onetary m anoeuvres, coupled with non-mone- 
ta ry  ones, were p a rts  of a form idable arsenal of economic isolation and 
cu t-th roat com petition. The process th a t had lasted but a few years 
brought home instructive lessons to  the  capitalist world. In m onetary 
m atters the  lesson was th a t  the  value of the advantages, en­
sured bv th e  said m anoeuvres, was not significant and their effect 
was short-lived. It was gradually realized th a t it would have been 
foolish to  disregard the  long-run in terests of W estern economic collab­
oration. In 1933, at a tim e when the  W orld Economic Conference was 
sitting , m onetary cooperation did not prove feasible, a fact th a t was 
a ttr ib u ted  to  W ashington’s a ttitude . Subsequent developm ents warned, 
however, th a t  freedom of action was com patible with international 
collaboration. I t  should be pointed out th a t  the  considerations, under­
lying the  193(5 T ripartite  M onetary Agreement, outdid the 1933 concept. 
I t  was no longer a m onetary “truce which was at stake. I he Agreement 
s tipu lated  for perm anent m onetary cooperation, though weakened by 
the  24-hour policy.
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The realization l>v the W estern world of the  need for perm anent 
cooperation pointed to  the  advent o f a new era. This era had begun in 
1036, and entered ano ther stage afte r 1045. The developm ents of the 
short period, covering the years from 1036 till 1030. were different, 
however, from those of the post-1945 years. The 1036-1030 period was. 
in fact, a transition  to  the postw ar epoch. In the  course of the  la tte r, the 
blueprints of postw ar m onetary planning came to  be realized, and the 
International M onetary Fund, a perm anent institu tion  of the  capi­
ta list world, was established. In  view of the fact th a t the basic principle 
of the  1 936 - 1039 period was cooperation in the  m onetary field, those 
few years might be linked, as far as the  aim was concerned, wit h the post- 
1945epoch rather than  with th e  1931 -  1936 period when the in te rnation ­
al m onetary scene had been dom inated by centrifugal forces.
Yet, as far as the  methods were concerned, the 1936-1930  period, 
and its product, the T ripartite  M onetary Agreement, might be linked 
with the 1031 — 1036 period. The Agreement did not s tipu la te  for the 
approval by an international organization of th e  proposed changes in the 
par values of the c urrencies, nor did it provide funds, designed to  alleviate 
difficulties of the balances of paym ents. Both were done w ithin the  fram e­
work of the Bretton Woods system . Under the  T ripartite  M onetary A- 
greement the stab ility  of the  exchanges was to  be ensured by th e  transac­
tions in gold and foreign exchange, carried out by the cooperating Exchange 
Equalization Funds or Stabilization Funds of the  countries adhering to  
the Agreement. This mechanism was based on the  trad itional cooperation 
practice of the central banks. The governm ents did not assume an ob­
ligation regarding the m aintenance of exchange stab ility . The la tte r  be­
came a problem to be solved w ithin th e  Bretton Woods system .
Nevertheless, th e  1936 gentlem an’s agreement did have a new fea­
ture . It was a higher degree of s ta te  intervention in the m onetary field. 
The said agencies, en trusted  w ith the  task of regulating the exchange 
rates, were, in fact, organs set up by the  monopoly capitalist s ta te . Their 
establishm ent indicated the need for new types of institu tions, indis­
pensable to  the functioning of the capitalist system , and gave a proof of the  
developm ent process of s ta te  monopoly capitalism . The quasi-autom atic 
function of the gold flow, viz. the equalization of domestic and foreign 
price levels, ceased to  operate. This function had become, in fact, a th ing 
of the past ever since the  G reat Depression, but the  capitalist world 
was unable to  give up the illusions, associated with the harmonious prog­
ress of capitalism  and with the gold flow, despite the fact th a t  events 
gave evidence of the opposite. The 1936 Agreement put an end to  those 
illusions, and the leading W estern states had to  admit this. N ever­
theless, certain illusions in respect of the freedom of the m arket econo­
mies survived, and were encouraged by t he existence of th e  gold m arkets 
and the  m utual convertibility of the principal currencies. This did not 
alter the  fact, however, th a t it was the  sta te  which controlled the main 
levers of the  various spheres of economic relations. The gold standard  
ceased to  exist, despite the fact tha t much was said after 1936 of a “re-
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form ed” gold standard . I ts  last stronghold, the gold bloc collapsed; its 
members followed the  exam ple of France, and joined the  T ripartite  Mone­
tary  Agreement. Gold, a  previous symbol of rising capitalism  and of 
private enterprise, became a medium of s ta te  transactions; its funda­
mental role was essentially t he final settlem ent of th e  balances of paym en t.
*
Section 4 of the T ripa rtite  Agreement stressed the  link between the  
success of the  m onetary policy and the  development of international 
trade . This in terp reta tion  of tlie said interaction points to  tlie concept 
adopted by postw ar planners. Postw ar planning, carried out in the course 
of World War II. envisaged a  homogeneous system  of economic relations, 
and laid the foundations of specialized international organizations, 
each form ing part of a massive edifice. However, under the  conditions 
of the  second half of the  th irties, m onetary cooperation could not be 
supplem ented by a comprehensive convention covering the field of in ter­
national trade. The main obstacle was th a t  Anglo-American trade re­
lations were strained, due largely to  the  operation of the preferential 
system  of the British Em pire. Simultaneously with the preparatory 
steps, aimed a t the  realignm ent of m onetary relations, W ashington made 
efforts concerning the conclusion of an Anglo-American trade  agreement, 
too. The British G overnm ent’s response was cool, however. The Anglo- 
American trade  agreem ent was completed only afte r pro tracted  nego­
tiations, in the fall of 1938. The agreem ent, signed by the  chief rivals 
in international trade, could not become the  hard  core of W estern com­
mercial cooperation. There were two main reasons for this. First of all, 
only a few m onths were left until the  outbreak of World W ar II . F urther, 
the  establishm ent of a  m ultilateral trad e  system  of the capitalist world, 
based on American commercial policy principles, would have dem anded 
a shift in Anglo-American power relations. 'I his was to  take place during 
the  war, a t  the expense of Britain.
The T ripartite  M onetary Agreement was a prelude to  a permanent 
economic cooperation bet ween W estern coun tries.! he t irst step was not fol­
lowed by others, however. The process came to  a  standstill. The conditions 
of the  th irties did not lend them selves to  the  creation of a m ultilateral 
economic area, freed from its in ternal barriers and heading foi a highei 
degree of integration. Views stressing the prospects of capitalist economic 
integration, voiced mainly in the  League of Nations, or developed in the 
silence of studies, rem ained sterile theories in those years. The tr ip a rtite  
M onetary Agreement itself was put to  a  tes t. France continued to  be 
the  vulnerable part of W estern m onetary cooperation. In 1937, the 
m aintenance of the stab ility  of the devalued franc proved impossible. 
The validity of the  T ripartite  Agreement was challenged. The decision 
of W ashington and London was th a t  a  coll apse of W estern m onetary coop­
eration was to  be avoided. On Ju ly  1, 1937, they  informed Paris that the 
Agreement was to  be upheld.
The decision of th e  U nited S tates and Britain m arked the  lim its of 
W estern economic cooperation prior to  W orld W ar II . 1 he fact th a t t hey
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decided to  uphold the  T ripa rtite  Agreement furnished evidence of their 
readiness to  continue to  cooperate in th e  m onetary field. Hut, a t th e  same 
tim e, they made clear th a t  the  m ethods were to  rem ain unchanged, despite 
the fact, th a t  the  Agreement proved inadequate for ensuring a lasting 
stab ility  of m onetary relations and for prom oting the  consolidation of 
the international economy. Vet, the  fundam ental obstacles to  a higher 
degree of m onetary cooperation were not the  inadequacy of th e  technical 
arrangem ents, provided for by the Agreement, and the lack of a  m echa­
nism prom oting integration. Ideas were in the offing in th is respect. A vig­
orous encouragement on the  part of the governm ents as well as an a t ­
mosphere conducive to  unequivocal W estern collaboration might have 
given im petus to  the evolution of such ideas; th e  concept of an adequate 
mechanism might have been developed. Such incentives were not 
forthcoming, however. This was the  main reason why W estern m onetary 
cooperation could not reach a  more advanced stage, and <>-ot stuck at 
the  1936 level.
( hief determ inants of international economic cooperation were the 
foreign policies of the W estern democracies. These policies set limits 
to m onetary cooperation, E fforts, aimed at developing an active American 
foreign policy ready to  assume obligations in the international scene, 
were hampered by the determ ination of the A dm inistration to  keep out 
of world conflicts. British foreign policy was dom inated by the  practices 
of the appeasers . I he m akers of French foreign policy com m itted 
them selves to  a course contrary  to  the  in terests of France. Thus, French 
foreign policy could not become a pillar of W estern collaboration either.
I he foreign policies of W estern democracies ruled out the possibility of 
close economic ties which could have been regarded by the Fascist sta tes as 
a prelude to  an a ttem p t to  forming a political bloc. W ashington, London, 
and Paris, wanted to  avoid such a contingency. In  fact, economic collab- 
01 at ion, based on unequivocal anti-Fascist political considerations such 
as proposed by Morgen than , was alien to  foreign policies of the three 
W estern democracies, chiefly to  those of Britain and France, being directly 
interested in European affairs.
I he provisions of t he T ripartite  Agreement which called for the  pro­
gressive relaxation of t he system  of quotas and exchange controls w ith a 
\ iew to their abolition, and invited other countries to  cooperate, in fact 
reflected the  economic aspect of political “appeasem ent”. It was well- 
known th a t  the devices, referred to  by the  Agreement, were employed 
chiefly by Fascist states. Thus, the invitation to  cooperate could be in­
terpreted  in such a way th a t certain promises on the  p a rt of Rome and 
Berlin regarding the  moderation of the  devices, condemned by the T ri­
partite  Agreement, might enable the Fascist s ta tes  to  join W estern eco­
nomic cooperation. E vents which took place prior to  the outbreak of 
World W ar 11 gave evidence of the fact th a t  th e  concept of the T ripartite  
M onetary Agreement, referred to  above, was akin to  o ther actions aimed 
at economic appeasement . 1 he Van Zeeland mission should be m entioned 
in th is respect.
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